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I. INTRODUCTION
The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom
may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of
intricacy and nicety; and these may in a particular manner be
expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution
founded upon a total or partial incorporation of a number of dis-
tinct sovereignties. 'Tis time only that can mature and perfect so
compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts,
and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consis-
tent whole. - Alexander Hamilton1
THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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The Framers of the U.S. Constitution recognized that they were entering
unknown territory by setting up a dual system of state and federal governments.
True to Hamilton's prediction, many intricate questions have arisen regarding
the balance of power between the states and the federal government. 2 One of the
most debated questions is whether private citizens can sue the states in federal
court to enforce individual rights under federal law or whether the states enjoy
immunity from such suits. 3 Historically, protecting individual rights has been an
important role of the federal government, but enforcing individual rights against
violations by states threatens the states' sovereignty.4 This Article examines the
struggle to balance these important interests. First, the Article reviews the his-
tory of state immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. Second, the Article dis-
cusses abrogation of state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. Third,
the Article examines the most recent facet of this struggle: enforcing the rights
of non-suspect classes, such as people who are elderly or disabled, against viola-
tions by states. Finally, the Article concludes that, under the Supreme Court's
current stringent test for proper abrogation of state immunity, Congress proba-
bly cannot abrogate state immunity in legislation that protects non-suspect
classes.
II. HISTORY OF STATE IMMUNITY
A. Origins of State Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment
State immunity from suit in federal court is central to our federalist sys-
tem, affecting the balance of power between the states and the federal govern-
ment.5 Although most legal scholars agree that the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity originated in Europe, its development in the United States is less clear.6
Many scholars believe that the states surrendered some of their sovereign im-
munity when they formed the United States, that Article III of the Constitution
gave federal courts the power to hear suits against states as defendants, and that
the Eleventh Amendment subsequently restored state immunity from such suits.
7
Others, including a majority of the current Supreme Court, believe that Article
III did not give the federal courts the power to hear cases involving states as
defendants; rather, the Eleventh Amendment merely corrected a misinterpreta-
2 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 88-89 (13th ed.
1997).
3 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 391-93 (3d ed. 1999).
4 See id. at 388.
5 See id. at 390.
6 See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of'the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1064-65 (1983).
7 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 390-96.
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tion of Article III, restoring the original constitutional limits of the federal
courts.8
Despite the uncertainty about the origin of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in the United States, it is clear that Congress intended to provide state
immunity through the Eleventh Amendment.9 Congress proposed the Eleventh
Amendment in response to Chisholm v. Georgia,l0 a 1793 case involving a suit
against a state by a citizen of another state." In Chisholm, the Supreme Court
accepted jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave the Court
original jurisdiction over suits between states and citizens of other states. 12 Con-
gress passed the Judiciary Act just prior to Chisholm, relying on Article III, Sec-
tion 2, of the Constitution, which reads, in part, that "[t]he judicial power shall
extend to ... controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State..
and "in all cases ... in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction."'
14
Although textually Article III appeared to support Supreme Court juris-
diction in Chisholm, the country reacted so negatively to the suit that Congress
proposed the Eleventh Amendment at its first meeting after the decision. 15 Ap-
parently, Congress intended to override the result in Chisholm and prevent fur-
ther suits in federal court against states by citizens of other states. 16 The text of
the Eleventh Amendment expressly prohibits state-citizen federal diversity suits
in law or equity:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign states.'
7
8 See id. See also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996) ("[T]he
Eleventh Amendment stood for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity lim-
ited the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III."); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15
(1890) ("The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbid-
den by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power
of the United States.").
9 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 395-96.
10 2 U.S. 419 (1793), overruled by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
II Id.
12 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
13 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
14 Id. at cl. 2.
15 Hans, 134 U.S. at 11.
16 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 394.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
20011
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However, despite its limited textual meaning, legal scholars disagree about the
scope of the Eleventh Amendment and courts, including the Supreme Court,
have not been consistent in interpreting it.'
8
B. Supreme Court Expansion of State Immunity
Prior to the Civil War, the Supreme Court limited the application of
state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to state-citizen diversity suits.' 9
The Amendment was not thought to bar suits against states by their own citi-
zens, federal question suits against states, or suits against state officials acting
illegally under federal law.20 However, this limited interpretation may have pre-
vailed only because the Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to address
the application of the Eleventh Amendment to such suits until after 1875 when




Congress gave the federal courts general federal question jurisdiction in
the aftermath of the Civil War.22 As a result, many people sued southern states
in federal court after the states defaulted on revenue bonds, allegedly in viola-
tion of the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.23 When these cases made their
way to the Supreme Court, the Court made its first expansion of the Eleventh
Amendment.24 In 1890 in Hans v. Louisiana,25 a resident of Louisiana brought
suit against the State in federal court alleging a Contracts Clause violation.26 The
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to bar not only suits
against states by citizens of other states, but also suits against states by their own
citizens.27 Thus, unless the states waived their immunity, the states were im-
mune from prosecution in federal court and the debts they owed were, in effect,
relieved. The broader repercussion of Hans was that, absent congressional legis-
18 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 388.
19 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1084.
20 Id. at 1084-87.
21 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 264. Prior to 1875, Congress passed several statutes
giving the federal courts jurisdiction over specific matters, but did not give federal courts juris-
diction over all federal questions until the 1875 Act. Id.
22 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1087.
23 Id. at 1087-88.
24 Id. at 1088.
25 134 U.S. 1(1890).
26 Id.
27 See id. at 12-21.
28 See infra text accompanying notes 36-41.
[Vol. 104
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lation,29 the federal judiciary did not have jurisdiction over federal question suits
involving private citizens as plaintiffs and states as defendants.3°
In 1921, the Supreme Court further expanded the Eleventh Amendment
when it decided that states were immune to suits in admiralty, even though the
text of the Eleventh Amendment only referred to suits in law or equity.3' The
Court explained that "the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does
not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
state without consent given ... [n]or is the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
exempt from the operation of the rule. 32 Similarly, in 1934 the Court extended
the Eleventh Amendment to suits brought by foreign governments against the
states. 33 The Court declared that it could not "assume that the letter of the Elev-
enth Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting
States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which
limit and control. '34
Thus, by 1934, the Supreme Court had expanded the Eleventh Amend-
ment to provide states with immunity not only in suits against states by citizens
of another state, but also in suits by states' own citizens and in suits by foreign
governments. Further, the Court extended state immunity beyond suits in law
and equity to include suits in admiralty.
C. Limitations on State Immunity
Although the Supreme Court expanded Eleventh Amendment state im-
munity in several ways, the Court also carved out three exceptions. 35 One excep-
tion is a state's waiver of immunity.36 The Supreme Court has established that a
state can waive its immunity and thus consent to suit in federal court.37 Such
waiver of immunity can be either express or implied.38 Express waiver generally
29 See infra text accompanying notes 51-58.
30 See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 1088.
31 See Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
32 Id.
33 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
34 Id. at 322.
35 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 389.
36 Id. at 431.
37 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) ("[I]f a State
waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
the action."); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) ("The immunity from suit belonging
to a State, which is respected and protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial
power of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure.").
38 Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REv. 793, 798 (1998).
2001]
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is made through a state statute or state constitution, and requires a state to
clearly express its consent to be sued in federal court.39 In contrast, implied
waivers generally occur when a state participates in federal litigation or federal
programs.4° However, the Supreme Court has so severely restricted implied
waivers and made the tests for both express and implied waiver so stringent that
waivers are rarely found.41
The second exception to state immunity involves suits against state offi-
cials, as opposed to the states themselves.42 In Ex parte Young, the Court held
that a state official, acting in his official capacity, could be sued in federal court,
but only for injunctive relief to stop the official from continuing unconstitutional
behavior.44 The Court held that a suit against a state official to stop the official
from violating the constitutional rights of a citizen is not a suit against the state
itself, so the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such an action.45 This distinc-
tion between a state and its officials has been criticized as an obvious legal fic-
tion.46 The premise is that a state official who acts unconstitutionally is stripped
of the state's authority and, therefore, the official is not entitled to state immu-
39 See id. at 798-99.
40 See Note, Reconceptualizing the Role of Constructive Waiver after Seminole, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1759, 1767, 1770 (1999). Congress has the power to condition receipt of federal money
on states' consent to suit in federal court as long it clearly expresses its intent to do so and the
conditions on spending are reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure. See id. at 1774.
See also infra text accompanying notes 201-04.
41 See, e.g., College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 686-87 (1999) (limiting implied waiver of state immunity to instances when Congress
requires waiver of state immunity as a condition on approval of interstate compacts or on re-
ceipt of federal funds); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 433, 436.
42 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 412.
43 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Ex parte Young has been called one of the most important Supreme
Court cases ever decided. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 412. Without it, federal courts would
essentially be powerless to prevent state violations of the Constitution and federal law. Id. at
415.
44 See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159. Along the same lines, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21
(1991), the Court ruled that a private citizen could sue a state official in the official's individual
capacity and seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court stated that
[w]hile the doctrine of Ex parte Young does not apply where a plaintiff
seeks damages from the public treasury, damages awards against individual
defendants in federal courts "are a permissible remedy in some circum-
stances notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office." That is, the
Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose "indi-
vidual and personal liability" on state officials under § 1983.
Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30-31 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974)).
45 See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
46 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 414-15.
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nity.4 However, the Constitution does not prohibit private conduct, so if the
official is stripped of state authority, the official is essentially a private entity
and should not be subject to suit for constitutional violations.48 The Supreme
Court explained this apparent inconsistency by distinguishing "state action"
under the Eleventh Amendment from "state action" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 49 Because the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted specifically as
a limitation on the states, it included a more expansive definition of "state ac-
tion." 50 Hence, individual conduct not entitled to state immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment may nonetheless constitute state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The final exception to state immunity involves congressional abrogation
of state immunity through legislation. 5' Beginning with Hans v. Louisiana, the
Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment impliedly limited federal
question jurisdiction in suits against non-consenting states.52 However, in 1976
the Court held that Congress could abrogate the states' immunity while acting
pursuant to its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. 53 The Court, noting
that the Fourteenth Amendment shifted the federal-state balance of power,
stated that "[t]here can be no doubt that . . . Congress, acting under the Civil
War Amendments, [can intrude] into the judicial, executive, and legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States. 54 Additionally, in 1989
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,55 the Court decided that Congress could not
only abrogate state immunity when acting pursuant to its authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but also when acting pursuant to its Commerce Clause
47 Id. at 414.
48 Id. at 415.
49 Id. Manipulating the definition of "state action" in this manner seems as fictional as
making a distinction between "state" and "state officials," but has been accepted as a way to
circumvent the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
50 See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286-89 (1913).
51 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 436-37.
52 See 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
53 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In later cases, the Court added the re-
quirement that Congress must clearly express its intent to abrogate state immunity; that is,
abrogation cannot be implied. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246
(1985) (stating that a general authorization for suit in federal court is insufficient); Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (holding that Congress did not abrogate state immunity in §
1983 because it did not explicitly and by clear language indicate its intent to do so). See also
infra text accompanying notes 86-87 (discussing the requirement that Congress clearly express
its intent to abrogate state immunity).
54 Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455.
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power under Article I of the Constitution.56 The Court reasoned that the states
gave up part of their sovereign immunity when they formed the United States,
and by giving Congress the power to regulate commerce the states specifically
surrendered any sovereign immunity that would stand in the way of such regula-
tion.57 The Court concluded that there was no difference between the shift in the
federal-state balance created by the Fourteenth Amendment and that created by
the Commerce Clause.58
Therefore, as of 1989, the Supreme Court recognized three exceptions
to state immunity: state waiver of immunity, suits against state officials, and
congressional abrogation through legislation. However, Congress's power to
abrogate state immunity through legislation was significantly reduced in the
landmark Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.5 9
D. New Era of Expansion of State Immunity
In 1996, the Supreme Court overruled Union Gas, marking the begin-
ning of a new era of expansion of state immunity. 60 In Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida,6' the Supreme Court held that Congress's Article I powers do not override
Article 11 or Eleventh Amendment proscriptions.62 Seminole Tribe involved a
challenge to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, a statute passed by
Congress under its Article I power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes.63
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that "[e]ven when the
Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by
56 Id. at 16-17. The Union Gas Court was deeply divided on the issues presented in the case.
For example, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and White agreed that Congress
could abrogate state immunity when legislating under the Commerce Clause, while Justices
Scalia, Rehnquist, O'Conner, and Kennedy dissented on the issue. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia agreed that Congress had clearly expressed its intent to abrogate
state immunity in the statute at issue, while Justices Rehnquist, O'Conner, Kennedy, and White
believed that Congress had not clearly expressed such intent. Id. at 4.
57 Id. at 14 (quoting Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964)).
58 Id. at 16.
59 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), and holding that Congress
cannot abrogate state immunity when legislating pursuant to its Article I power).
60 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 389.
61 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (5-4 decision). The majority included the four dissenters in Union
Gas, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Conner, and Kennedy, joined by a new
member of the Court, Justice Thomas. The minority included Justices Souter, Stevens, Gins-
burg, and Breyer. Id. at 46.
62 Id. at 72-73.
63 See id. at 47.
[Vol. 104
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private parties against unconsenting States." 64 The decision thus restored the
broad scope of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and reduced the power of the
federal government to enforce federal laws.65
In overruling Union Gas, the majority in Seminole Tribe stressed that
Union Gas was a "deeply fractured," plurality opinion that departed from the
established "principle that state sovereign immunity limited the federal courts'
jurisdiction under Article 11. ' ,66 The Court stated that the conclusion in Union
Gas that the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment equally affected
the balance of federal-state power was "misplaced. 67 Rather, as the Seminole
Tribe Court explained, only the Fourteenth Amendment altered the federal-state
balance of power; otherwise, the states enjoyed common law sovereign immu-
nity from suit in federal court.68
Justice Souter wrote a lengthy dissent in Seminole Tribe, stating that the
majority was "fundamentally mistaken., 69 After exploring the arguments made
by the Framers of the Constitution, the history and text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and relevant case law, Justice Souter concluded that there was no common
law sovereign immunity incorporated into either the original Constitution or the
Eleventh Amendment.7° In Justice Souter's opinion, the Eleventh Amendment
reached only citizen-state diversity suits and not federal question suits.71 There-
fore, he found the majority decision to be an "abdication of [the Court's] re-
sponsibility to exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to [the Court] in Article 111.
"
172
64 See id. at 72.
65 See generally id. (explaining that the Court was merely reconfirming the principle of state
sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and inherent in the nature of sover-
eign immunity is the principle that states are not amenable to the suit of an individual, absent
consent). In addition to limiting congressional power to abrogate state immunity through Arti-
cle I powers, the Seminole Tribe decision also narrowed somewhat the Ex parte Young doctrine
by limiting its application to suits involving federal laws with comprehensive enforcement
mechanisms. Id. at 74. In a subsequent case, the Court further narrowed the Ex parte Young
doctrine by holding that state officials cannot be sued to quiet title to submerged lands, but
refused to reformulate Ex parte Young to a case-by-case balancing approach as advocated by
Justice Kennedy. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (5-4 decision). The
same 5-4 split found in Seminole Tribe made up the majority and minority in Couer d'Alene. Id.
at 262-63.
66 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64.
67 Id. at 65.
68 Id. at 65-66 (explaining that the original federal-state balance of power in the Constitution
did not allow Congress to abrogate state immunity, so that any congressional powers created
prior to the Eleventh Amendment (i.e., all powers enumerated in Article I) did not include the
power to abrogate).
69 Id. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 185.
71 See id. at 110-11.
72 Id. at 185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Subsequent Supreme Court cases illustrate the significance of the Semi-
nole Tribe decision. For example, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,73 a private bank invented a special type
of college-savings account, for which it received a federal patent.74 When the
State of Florida introduced a similar account, the private bank sued the State for
patent infringement under the Patent Remedy Act.75 The State moved to dismiss
on the ground of sovereign immunity, while the bank argued that the State was
not entitled to immunity because Congress had properly abrogated state immu-
nity in the Patent Remedy Act.76 The Court, citing Seminole Tribe, made clear
that Congress does not have the power to abrogate state immunity when legislat-
ing pursuant to any of its Article I powers, including the Patent Clause. 77 Thus,
absent its consent, the State of Florida was not subject to suit in federal court for
allegedly violating the Patent Remedy Act.
Another case that illustrates the significance of Seminole Tribe is
Alden v. Maine.78 In Alden, the State of Maine challenged Congress's power to
require states to hear federal question suits against the State in the State's own
court.
7 9 The plaintiffs, a group of probation officers for the State of Maine, tried
to bring suit against their employer in federal court under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.8° While the suit was pending, the Court decided Seminole Tribe, and
the Alden suit was consequently dismissed. 8' The plaintiffs then filed the same
action in state court because the Act authorized private actions against states in
state court. 82 Maine challenged the suit on the ground that sovereign immunity
prevented Congress from forcing the State to hear federal question suits against
the State in the State's own courts.83 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that
"the powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the Constitution do not
include the power to subject non-consenting States to private suits for damages
73 527 U.S 627 (1999) (5-4 decision).
74 Id. at 630-31. The same split of Justices found in Seminole Tribe comprised the majority
and minority in Florida Prepaid. Id. at 629.
75 Id. at 632-33.
76 Id. at 633.
77 Id. at 636. Although Congress can sometimes abrogate state immunity pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Florida Prepaid held that Congress had not properly done
so in the Patent Remedy Act. Id. at 647.
78 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (5-4 decision). Again, the same split of Justices found in Seminole
Tribe comprised the majority and minority in Alden. Id. at 710.
79 See id. at 712.
80 Id. at 711.





West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss1/10
THE RIGHTS OF NON-SUSPECT CLASSES
in state courts." 84
Thus, in the past decade the Supreme Court has severely restricted Con-
gress's power to abrogate state immunity through legislation. However, Con-
gress may still abrogate state immunity when appropriately legislating under its
Fourteenth Amendment powers.85 The issue, then, is what constitutes "appropri-
ate legislation" when determining whether Congress can abrogate state immu-
nity.
III. ABROGATION OF STATE IMMUNITY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
To determine whether Congress properly abrogated state immunity in
particular legislation, courts apply a two-part test: first, Congress must un-
equivocally express its intent to abrogate immunity, and second, the legislation
at issue must be appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. 86 The
first part of the test is straightforward: Congress's intent to abrogate immunity
"must be obvious from 'a clear legislative statement.,,' 87 The second part of the
test is more difficult to apply.88 To understand what is appropriate legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is important to review the history of legis-
lation under the Amendment, as well as recent judicial developments.
A. History of Legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment was passed in the aftermath of the Civil
War, giving the federal government the power to protect recently freed slaves
from oppression by the states. 89 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, com-
monly known as the Equal Protection Clause, states in part that "[a]ll persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."9 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause, stating that "Congress shall have power to
84 Id.
85 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (upholding Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976), which established Congress's power to abrogate state immunity in Fourteenth
Amendment legislation).
86 Id. at 55.
87 Id. at 55 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991)).
88 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimina-
tion Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 457-58 (2000) (discussing that
the test for appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment is ambiguous and not fully
developed by the Court).
89 See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 420.
90 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."91
Although the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
protect the rights of freed slaves following the Civil War, courts have inter-
preted the Amendment's broad language to impose a general restraint on the use
of classifications. 92 Historically the Supreme Court defined the breadth of pro-
tection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, while Congress merely used its
Section 5 power to enact legislation to protect rights that had been judicially
recognized.93 However, in 1966 in Katzenbach v. Morgan,94 the Supreme Court
suggested that Congress, when legislating under the Fourteenth Amendment,
did, in fact, have the power to determine what substantive rights the Amendment
protected, even rights the Supreme Court had not recognized. 95
Morgan involved a challenge to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
barred literacy tests for Puerto Ricans educated in Spanish-language schools.96
The State of New York challenged the Act because the Act prohibited the State
from enforcing its own voting law, which required an ability to read and write
English. 97 The State argued that Congress could not appropriately pass legisla-
tion barring English literacy requirements because the Supreme Court had not
determined that such requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 98 Despite the State's argument, the Court upheld the
Voting Rights Act, stating that neither the language nor the history of Section 5
supports the conclusion that Congress is limited to enforcing judicially recog-
nized rights. 99 The Court held that Section 5 is a "positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 10o
91 Id. § 5 (emphasis added).
92 See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 421 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
used sweeping and general terms, not limited to race, color, or previous condition of servitude).
93 See id. at 984.
94 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
95 See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 984.
96 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643.
97 Id. at 643-45.
98 Id. at 648.
99 Id. at 648-49.
100 Id. at 65 1.
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B. Recent Judicial Developments Affecting Abrogation of State Immunity
under the Fourteenth Amendment
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,10 the Court first examined how the Fourteenth
Amendment affected state immunity.10 2 In Fitzpatrick, male employees of the
State of Connecticut brought a class action suit against the State claiming that
the State's retirement system discriminated against them under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, an act applied to the states under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.10 3 The principal question was whether, the Eleventh
Amendment notwithstanding, Congress had the power to authorize federal
courts to award damages against the State as a means of enforcing the substan-
tive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. °4 The Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment specifically limited state immunity, and therefore, Congress
could abrogate state immunity under Section 5.105
Congress's power to abrogate state immunity under Section 5, com-
bined with the implication in Morgan that Congress had the power to define the
substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, appeared to allow Con-
gress broad power to abrogate state immunity in legislation protecting individual
rights against state defendants1 °6 However, in 1997 in City of Boerne v. Flo-
res,10 7 the Supreme Court both clarified and significantly narrowed the circum-
stances under which Congress can appropriately pass legislation under Section
5.108 In turn, the Court's decision narrowed Congress's ability to abrogate state
immunity.1°9 In Flores, the Court found the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (RFRA) to be unconstitutional because the Act attempted to expand the
constitutional rights of individuals to religious freedom.' 10 The RFRA required
101 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 447-48.
104 id. at 448.
105 Id. at 456.
106 See James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims Against State
Entities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Seminole Tribe and Flores, 41 ARIZ.
L. REV. 651, 676 (1999) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966), which stated
that the standard for determining what is proper legislation under Section 5 was to judge what
was necessary to carry out congressional powers).
107 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
108 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 445.
109 See id.
110 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 536. Congress passed the RFRA in response to Employment
Division v. Smith, a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Oregon
law that prohibited the use of the drug peyote. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith, who used peyote in
his religious practices as a member of the Native American Church, was denied unemployment
compensation after he lost his job for using peyote in violation of Oregon law. Id. at 874. Smith
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states to have a compelling interest before burdening individual religious free-
dom."' The City of Boerne, Texas, challenged the constitutionality of the
RFRA after a Catholic church relied on the Act to oppose a local zoning law
under which the City denied the church a building permit. 1 2 The Flores Court
determined that the RFRA expanded the constitutional right to religious freedom
as previously defined by the Supreme Court." 3 Although the Court acknowl-
edged that Morgan could be construed to mean that Congress had the power to
enlarge constitutional rights via its Fourteenth Amendment power,"14 the Court
nevertheless held that Congress does not have such power." 15 Rather, Congress's
power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment is remedial in nature." 6 Relying
on a separation of powers argument, the Court stated that it alone determines the
scope of constitutional protection; Congress's power is limited to enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment through legislation that remedies or prevents a judi-
cially recognized constitutional violation." 7
In addition, the Flores Court clarified the meaning of the Morgan
Court's statement that Congress determines "whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 18 The Flores
Court explained that "legislation [that] deters or remedies constitutional viola-
tions can fall within the sweep of Congress' [s] enforcement power even if in the
process it prohibits conduct [that] is not itself unconstitutional."'" 9 The Court
cited the Voting Rights Act at issue in Morgan as one example of how legisla-
tion can prohibit constitutional behavior and yet still be remedial. 20 The Flores
challenged the Oregon law as a violation of his constitutional guarantee to free exercise of relig-
ion. Id. The Court upheld the Oregon law, stating that the Constitution allowed neutral, generally
applicable laws, like the law at issue, to be applied to religious practices even when not supported
by a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 885-86.
II Flores, 521 U.S. at 515.
112 See id. at 512.
11 See id. at 536. See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-86 (defining the permissible scope of a
state's infringement on religious practices); supra note 110 and accompanying text.
14 Flores, 521 U.S. at 527-28.
115 Id. at 519.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 535-36.
118 Id. at 536.
119 Id. at 518.
120 See id. The Voting Rights Act prohibits states from denying citizens the right to vote
solely because they cannot speak English and, accordingly, bans states from requiring literacy
tests for prospective voters. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994). Despite the fact that literacy tests are
facially constitutional, the Morgan Court upheld the Voting Rights Act's ban on literacy tests
as a means of preventing unconstitutional race discrimination in voting. See Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966).
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Court further explained that because it may be difficult to determine whether
legislation remedies or prevents unconstitutional actions, as opposed to substan-
tively changing constitutional rights, Congress must have wide latitude in mak-
ing that determination. 21 However, "Congress' [s] discretion is not unlimited, [ ]
and the courts retain the power ... to determine if Congress has exceeded its
authority under the Constitution."'' 22 The Court stated that the test to determine
whether congressional legislation is within the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is whether there is "congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." 123 Otherwise,
legislation may become "substantive in operation and effect."' 124 Because the
Court found the reach and scope of the RFRA to be too broad to be remedial or
preventive, the Court held that the RFRA was unconstitutional.' 5
Thus, Flores established a two-part test to determine whether legislation
is "appropriate legislation" under the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the legisla-
tion must be intended to remedy or prevent a judicially recognized violation of
constitutional rights. 26 Second, the legislation must be congruent and propor-
tional to the constitutional violation being addressed. 127 As discussed in Part IV
below, the Flores test, by narrowing what is considered appropriate legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment, has limited Congress's ability to enforce fed-
eral anti-discrimination laws against the states, particularly those laws that pro-
tect non-suspect classes.
IV. STATE IMMUNITY AND LEGISLATION PROTECTING NON-SUSPECT
CLASSES
Though it has been more than a century since the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was passed, the scope of its protection is still an issue. 28 Clearly the
Amendment, through the Equal Protection Clause, prohibits racial discrimina-
tion, but it has also been applied more generally to prohibit classifications that
burden other identifiable minorities.1 29 However, by limiting the scope of con-
gressional legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment to that which addresses
judicially recognized violations of constitutional rights, the Flores decision
121 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
122 Id. at 536.
123 Id. at 520.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 533-34.
126 Id. at 519.
127 Id. at 520.
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could dramatically restrict Congress's power to abrogate state immunity in
legislation that protects some of these minority groups. 130 When interpreting the
scope of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has afforded great
protection to minority groups such as racial minorities, labeled "suspect
classes,"'13 1 so such groups should be largely unaffected by Flores.132 However,
the Court has afforded less protection to other minority groups labeled "non-
suspect classes,"' 33 such as people who are elderly or disabled, and, as a result,
legislation protecting such groups could be at risk.134 As discussed in the follow-
ing section, recent Supreme Court cases have confirmed this prediction.
A. Age: Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents 35 involved a challenge to Congress's
abrogation of state immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age, a non-
suspect classification. 36 In determining whether Congress had properly abro-
gated state immunity in the ADEA, the Supreme Court initially found that Con-
gress had, in fact, clearly expressed its intention to do so. 37 Once this prong of
the test was addressed, the Court then applied the two-part Flores test for deter-
mining whether the ADEA was appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 138 First, the Court identified the scope of judicially recognized
constitutional protection afforded to older persons. 39 It concluded that because
130 See Rachel Toker, Tying the Hands of Congress: City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157 (1997), 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 273, 312 (1998).
131 "Suspect classification" refers to a classification based on a trait that itself seems to
contravene established constitutional principles so that any purposeful use of the classification
may be deemed suspect. Examples include race, sex, and national origin. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1460 (7th ed. 1999). When a statute classifies people based on a trait such as race,
the classification is said to be "suspect" and must survive "strict scrutiny," meaning that the use
of the classification must serve a "compelling" interest. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebure
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
132 See Toker, supra note 130, at 306.
133 As the term implies, "non-suspect classification" refers to a classification that is not
suspect, meaning that members of the class have not historically endured unequal treatment.
Examples include age and disability. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. A statute that classifies
people based on non-suspect traits must survive only a "rational basis" test, meaning that the
classification must be rationally related to a legitimate interest. See id. at 441-42.
134 See Toker, supra note 130, at 306.
135 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
136 Id. at 66, 83.
137 Id. at 73-74.
138 See id. at 80-91.
139 Id. at 83.
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age is traditionally a non-suspect classification, states can discriminate on the
basis of age as long as any age-based classification is rationally related to a le-
gitimate state interest.40
Once the Court determined the scope of constitutional protection, it then
concluded that the ADEA's restrictions on the use of age classifications went
well beyond that scope.14 1 However, because Congress can prohibit conduct that
is constitutional as long as its purpose in doing so is to remedy or prevent un-
constitutional conduct, the Court examined the legislative history of the ADEA
to determine whether Congress was in fact addressing unconstitutional con-
duct. 14 2 The Court found that Congress had "virtually no reason to believe that
state ... governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against their em-
ployees on the basis of age."'' 43 Therefore, because Congress had not identified
an existing pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states, the Court
held that the ADEA could not be considered remedial or preventative.144 Thus,
the ADEA failed the first part of the Flores test.
Applying the second part of the Flores test for appropriate legislation,
the Court next considered whether the scope of the ADEA was congruent and
proportional to the constitutional violation being addressed.145 Because the Act
required states to refrain from even rationally considering age in employment
decisions and practices, the Court determined that the ADEA was incongruent
and out of proportion with the protections afforded to older persons by the Equal
Protection Clause.' 46 Thus, the ADEA also failed the second part of the Flores
test, and therefore, the Court held that Congress had improperly abrogated state
immunity. 
147
The Kimel decision was the first Supreme Court decision to hold that
Congress exceeded its authority to enact anti-discrimination legislation protect-
ing a non-suspect class under Section 5.148 As such, Kimel provides some guid-
ance for assessing whether other anti-discrimination legislation protecting non-
suspect classes is appropriate legislation under Section 5. However, because the
Kimel Court did not discuss how Congress could overcome the problems that
led the Court to its decision, Kimel provides insufficient information to fully
140 Id.
141 Id. at 86. For example, the ADEA prohibits state employers from relying on age as a
proxy for other characteristics, but the Constitution does not prohibit such conduct. Id. at 88.
142 Id. at 88-89.
143 Id. at 91.
W4 Id. at 89-91.
141 See id. at 86.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 9 1.
148 See Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 657 (2000).
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determine whether other anti-discrimination legislation will survive similar chal-
lenges.
149
B. Disability: Board of Trustees v. Garrett
In Board of Trustees v. Garrett,150 the Supreme Court again considered
a challenge to anti-discrimination legislation protecting a non-suspect class, this
time people with disabilities. 151 In February of 2001, consistent with its recent
trend of expanding state immunity, the Supreme Court held that Congress had
again exceeded its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and, consequently, had improperly abrogated state immunity under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 5 2 The Court found that,
like the ADEA in Kimel, the ADA failed both parts of the Flores test.
153
First, the Garrett Court identified the scope of judicially recognized
constitutional protection afforded to people with disabilities., 54 Relying on a
prior Equal Protection case involving people with mental retardation, 55 the
Court affirmed that, as with age, disability classifications are non-suspect.1
56
Accordingly, states can discriminate on the basis of disability as long as any
disability-based classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
157
Thus, for example, states "are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to
make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards
such individuals are rational."'158 Further, even if states make disability-based
distinctions because of stereotypes and fears about people with disabilities, such
distinctions may still pass the rationality test as long as they "rationally further
[ ] the purpose identified by the State."'
159
149 See Post & Siegel, supra note 88, at 457-58 (2000) (discussing that the Court did not
explain the distinction between remedial and substantive legislation nor did it specify how
much congruence and proportionality is constitutionally necessary).
150 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (5-4 decision).
151 Id. at 960, 963. The same division of justices seen in other recent Supreme Court deci-
sions comprised the Garrett majority and dissent: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia,
Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy made up the majority and Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg comprised the dissent. Id. at 959.
152 Id. at 967-68.
153 Id. at 966-68.
154 Id. at 963. The question of whether Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate state
immunity in the ADA was not at issue in Garrett. Id. at 962.
155 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
156 Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963.
157 Id. at 964.
15s Id.
159 Id. (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam)).
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After identifying the scope of judicially recognized constitutional pro-
tection afforded to people with disabilities, the Court decided whether the ADA
was remedial or preventative legislation. 6° To make this determination, the
Court examined whether the ADA's legislative findings sufficiently identified a
pattern or history of unconstitutional discrimination by the states against people
with disabilities.161 Although arguably the legislative findings were more exten-
sive for the ADA than for the ADEA at issue in Kimel,162 the Court found that
Congress failed to "identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in em-
ployment against the disabled" before passing the ADA. 163 Therefore, the Court
determined that the ADA was not a remedial or preventative response to judi-
cially recognized unconstitutional discrimination, and thus failed the first part of
the Flores test.164
Applying the second part of the Flores test, the Court next examined
whether the ADA was congruent and proportional to the constitutional protec-
tions afforded to people with disabilities. 65 The Court concluded that the
ADA's requirements far exceeded what is constitutionally required.'6 For ex-
ample, the Court stated that although it would be rational and, therefore, consti-
tutional, for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring
employees who can use existing facilities, the ADA nonetheless requires em-
ployers to make existing facilities accessible to individuals with disabilities.'
67
In addition, the Court found that the ADA's prohibition on the use of employ-
ment selection methods that tend to screen out people with disabilities was too
broad because it did not consider whether such methods were rational. 68 As a
result, the Court determined that the ADA failed the second part of the Flores
test.' 69 Because the ADA failed both parts of the Flores test, the Court held that
160 See id.
161 Id. at 964-65.
162 See id. at 969 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Garrett dissent argued that Congress compiled
a "vast legislative record documenting 'massive, society-wide discrimination' against persons
with disabilities." Id. (citations omitted). The Garrett majority found this evidence to be
merely "unexamined, anecdotal accounts" of discrimination by state officials, and therefore
insufficient evidence of unconstitutional discrimination. Id. at 966.
163 Id. at 965. The Court's holding was limited to Title I of the ADA, which deals with
employment discrimination, as applied to the states because that was the only issue before the
Court. The Court did not decide whether Title II of the ADA, which deals with programs and
activities conducted by states, is likewise unconstitutional. Id. at 960 n. 1.
164 Id. at 965-66.
165 Id. at 966.
166 Id. at 967.
167 Id. at 966-67.
168 Id. at 967.
169 Id. at 966.
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it was not appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment and, accord-
ingly, Congress had improperly abrogated state immunity under the ADA.'
70
In contrast to the Garrett majority, Justice Breyer, writing for the dis-
sent, argued that the ADA passed both parts of the Flores test.' 71 First, although
he agreed with the Court that people with disabilities are only entitled to protec-
tion from irrational discrimination, Justice Breyer's definition of irrational was
broader than the Court's definition. 172 Breyer argued that discrimination that is
based on a desire to harm a politically unpopular group or that is based on out-
moded stereotypes and fears about people with disabilities is per se irrational
behavior and, therefore, prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 173 Applying
this broader definition of irrational discrimination, Justice Breyer concluded that
Congress had found ample evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion by the states against people with disabilities. 74 Therefore, he determined
that the ADA was, in fact, remedial, and met the first part of the Flores test.
175
Second, Justice Breyer found the ADA to be a congruent and propor-
tional response to irrational discrimination. 176 Although Breyer acknowledged
that the ADA's requirements went beyond prohibiting irrational discrimination,
he again applied his broader definition of irrational discrimination to find that
the ADA nonetheless was a reasonable response to the discrimination being
addressed. 177 Thus, Justice Breyer concluded that the ADA was appropriate leg-
islation under the Fourteenth Amendment and was a proper exercise of Con-
gress's power to abrogate state immunity.1
78
Finally, Justice Breyer admonished the Court for "improperly in-
vad[ing] a power that the Constitution assigns to Congress" by placing heavy
evidentiary demands on Congress, failing to defer to Congress's findings, and
failing to distinguish between judicial and legislative powers. 179 Breyer con-
cluded that the Court's application of the Flores test essentially "saps [Section]
5 of independent force."'
80
170 Id. at 967-68.
17 See id. at 969 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172 See id. at 969, 971.
173 See id. at 971. The majority, on the other hand, felt that such discriminatory behavior was
rational so long as it furthered a legitimate state interest. Id. at 964.
174 See id. at 972.
175 See id.
176 See id. at 974.
177 See id.
178 See id. at 976.
179 Id. at 975-76.
1'0 Id. at 976.
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C. What's Left for Non-Suspect Classes?
If, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his Garrett dissent, the Court's cur-
rent test for appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment renders
Section 5 "insignificant,"'' 81 what options do members of non-suspect classes
have when their rights are violated by state employers? Without the power to
enforce federal laws in federal court, non-suspect classes are left with few op-
tions when states violate their civil rights.1 82 Generally, individuals will still be
able to file complaints with federal enforcement agencies, seek injunctive relief
for ongoing violations, or perhaps seek relief in state court. 183 However, none of
these options fully replace the opportunity to seek damages in federal court.'8 4
First, because federal enforcement agencies have streamlined their investiga-
tions of discrimination cases to reduce backlog and provide relief to an over-
worked system, many complaints filed with those agencies will not be fully in-
vestigated. 185 Second, although injunctive relief may stop ongoing discrimina-
tion, it does nothing to remedy the damage done by prior discrimination.186 And
finally, individuals attempting to enforce their rights in state court may be lim-
ited to enforcing state anti-discrimination laws because state immunity from suit
under federal law extends to suits in a state's own courts.'
87
V. CAN CONGRESS ABROGATE STATE IMMUNITY IN LEGISLATION PROTECTING
NON-SUSPECT CLASSES?
With the current strict requirements for appropriate legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is unlikely that Congress will be able to abrogate
state immunity in legislation that protects non-suspect classes. First, the scope of
such legislation is limited to the Supreme Court's recognition of Fourteenth
Amendment protections and, according to the Court, non-suspect classes are
only protected against "irrational" discrimination. 188 Because the Court has nar-
rowly defined what constitutes irrational discrimination, non-suspect classes are
afforded very little protection. 189 Further, in applying the first part of the Flores
test, the Supreme Court holds Congress to "a strict, judicially created eviden-
181 Id.
182 See Note, supra note 40, at 1760-61.
183 Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 968 n.9.
14 See Note, supra note 40, at 1760-61.
185 See Leonard, supra note 106, at 665.
186 See Note, supra note 40, at 1761.
187 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
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tiary standard" to justify Fourteenth Amendment legislation, requiring detailed
findings of unconstitutional discrimination.'
90
As part of this evidentiary standard, the Court decided to use a rational
basis test when reviewing congressional evidence of discrimination against non-
suspect classes.' 9' Originally, the rational basis test was developed as a judicial
restraint to be used when the courts are reviewing a constitutional challenge to
state legislation that burdens a non-suspect minority group. 92 When reviewing
state legislation, a court looks at whether a state was rationally pursuing a le-
gitimate purpose when it passed the legislation at issue. 93 If so, the legislation
survives the constitutional challenge. 94 In contrast, in the context of state im-
munity the Court applies the rational basis test to any legislative findings con-
ducted prior to enactment of legislation protecting non-suspect classes to deter-
mine whether Congress found any evidence of irrational conduct by the states. 95
If Congress failed to find a history or pattern of irrational conduct by the states,
then the federal legislation at issue is not proper remedial or preventative
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, cannot overcome
the first hurdle of the Flores test. 196
Even if Congress can overcome this first hurdle, it must still overcome
the second hurdle of the Flores test: the legislation at issue must have a "con-
gruence and proportionality" to the injury being prevented. 97 Thus, the sweep
of legislation that protects non-suspect classes is limited to remedying or pre-
venting only "irrational" discrimination. 198 As a practical matter, considering the
Court's broadly defined scope of rational behavior, this limitation leaves Con-
gress little reason to apply anti-discrimination legislation to the states. For ex-
ample, according to the Garrett Court, it is rational for state employers to "con-
serve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use exist-
ing facilities."'199 If existing state facilities are not accessible to people with dis-
190 Id. at 972 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In the past, the Court placed the burden of proving
unconstitutionality on the party challenging a statute, not on the legislature that passed it. The
presumption was in favor of upholding the constitutionality of legislation, absent a contrary
showing by the party opposing it. Imposing a burden on Congress to prove the constitutionality
of its legislation is contrary to past practice. See id.
191 See id. at 963-64.
192 See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 635.
193 See id. at 636.
194 See id.
195 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963-64.
196 See id.
197 Id. at 966.
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abilities, Congress cannot require, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, that
states modify such facilities so people with disabilities can work. 200 Therefore,
the intent of laws like the ADA, to increase opportunities for people with dis-
abilities, will not be fulfilled when the employer in question is a state employer.
Hence, absent voluntary compliance by the states, such laws are virtually use-
less in preventing state discrimination against non-suspect classes.
Because the Court has made the test for appropriate legislation under
the Fourteenth Amendment so stringent, Congress may have to resort to enticing
the states to consent to suit in federal court to make federal legislation protecting
non-suspect classes enforceable.2 °1 Congress can entice states to consent to suit
through its spending power by conditioning receipt of federal funding upon such
consent.2 °2 However, the Supreme Court has held that such power is not unlim-
ited and is subject to several restrictions. 20 3 To properly obtain state consent to
suit, Congress's exercise of its spending power must be for the general welfare,
the conditions on spending must be clear and unambiguous, and the conditions
must be reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure.204 As a result, con-
sent to suit as a condition on receipt of federal funds, although possible, is lim-
ited.
VI. CONCLUSION
Balancing states' rights with individual federal rights was an issue even
before the U.S. Constitution was adopted. Over the ensuing years, the Supreme
Court has struggled to strike the proper balance, alternating between expanding
and contracting state immunity from suit in federal court. Currently the Court is
in an era of expansion, consistently ruling in favor of states' rights over en-
forcement of individual rights. By expanding state immunity and narrowing
established routes around state immunity, the Court has made it virtually impos-
sible for Congress to abrogate state immunity in legislation that protects the
rights of non-suspect classes. Existing anti-discrimination laws are being chal-
lenged and one-by-one being declared unconstitutional as applied to the states.
However, if history is any indication, we will probably see a reversal of this
200 See id.
201 See David A. Savage, The Next Federalism Frontier, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 30.
202 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). In fact, Congress has already condi-
tioned receipt of federal funds on states' waiver of immunity in suits alleging violation of sev-
eral federal anti-discrimination laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(7) (1994). The Supreme Court
recently declined to review an Eighth Circuit decision holding that Congress validly condi-
tioned receipt of federal funds on states' waiver of immunity in suits alleging disability dis-
crimination under the Rehabilitation Act. See Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, Ark. Dep't of Educ. v. Jim C., 121 S. Ct. 2591 (2001).
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trend in the future. As Alexander Hamilton said, "Tis time only that can mature
and perfect so compound a system., 20 5 Perhaps in time, we will strike the proper
balance between states' rights and enforcement of individual rights.
Linda Carter Batiste
205 THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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